Ukraine, Defence Industry, Defence Procurement

Ramstein 37: Nordic Defence Funding and Legal Risks for European Companies

The 37th Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting brought new Nordic and Baltic defence commitments, alongside agreements on defence AI and joint production. We examine the legal implications for European companies, including technology rights, export controls, data governance and contractual requirements.

Complex law. Clear action.

Reviewed by Oleksandr Sobovyi, Founder & CEO of CORVUS AI — editorial responsibility statement below.

The 37th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), held in Brussels on 17 November 2026, brought new military assistance commitments from Nordic and Baltic countries. Two developments are particularly relevant to European defence companies: Denmark's agreement with Ukraine on defence AI and battlefield data, and Finland's memorandum on joint defence production.

Both initiatives create opportunities for industrial cooperation. However, the public announcements leave important legal questions unanswered, including technology rights, access to data, export authorisations, contractual responsibilities and the conditions governing future production contracts.

The distinction matters. A government commitment to cooperate does not, by itself, establish the legal conditions under which a company can manufacture, transfer or commercialise defence technology.

1. What Was Agreed and Announced

Denmark: Defence AI and Avengers Labs

On 17 November, Ukrainian Defence Minister Evgeniy Khmara and Danish Defence Minister Jeppe Bruus signed a letter of intent on strategic cooperation in artificial intelligence and data.

The initiative covers the development of AI solutions based on operational experience, knowledge-sharing, cooperation between defence industries and the establishment of a bilateral working group.

Separately, Ukraine's Ministry of Defence and the Danish Defence AI Centre signed an agreement granting Denmark access to Avengers Labs.

According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, the platform contains approximately five million battlefield frames, primarily obtained through the DELTA combat management system.

Danish participants will be able to train, fine-tune and evaluate AI models within a secure environment without receiving direct access to the underlying dataset.

This arrangement offers a model for international defence AI cooperation. However, the published descriptions do not establish how rights to trained models, derivative results, commercial applications or onward transfers are allocated.

The separate Avengers Labs agreement may contain binding provisions. Its legal character cannot be determined without examining the actual text.

Sources: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence · Danish Ministry of Defence

Finland: Joint Defence Production

On 17 November, Ukraine and Finland signed a memorandum establishing a framework for producing Ukrainian defence systems in Finland.

The announced cooperation includes:

  • Joint manufacturing of defence products;

  • Technology transfer and research and development;

  • Investment in defence industrial capabilities;

  • Assistance with relevant permitting procedures;

  • Establishment of a joint steering board.

During the ongoing hostilities, most products manufactured under the cooperation are expected to be directed towards Ukraine's defence requirements.

The Finnish Government describes the arrangement as a framework for future industrial projects. It also builds on earlier bilateral cooperation, including the September 2026 agreement concerning drones.

The memorandum does not itself establish that a particular manufacturer has obtained production or export authorisation, nor does it disclose the commercial conditions governing future projects.

Sources: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence · Finnish Government

Announced Nordic and Baltic Support

According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, the 37th UDCG meeting produced the following announcements:

Country

Announced support

Denmark

€200 million for air defence and a further €645 million package covering drones, F-16 ammunition, interceptor systems and PURL

Finland

Two assistance packages totalling €291 million; a €40 million PURL contribution and another assistance package under preparation

Norway

Approximately $800 million in total support, including $300 million for PURL, $300 million for Ukrainian drones and $150 million for air defence; up to €11 million for counter-Shahed capabilities

Sweden

$71 million in assistance, including $20 million for PURL and $18 million for the Czech initiative

Estonia

A commitment to allocate at least 0.25% of GDP to Ukraine in 2027; preparation of €15 million for joint industrial projects

These figures combine confirmed allocations, announced contributions and future commitments. They should not be interpreted as evidence that all funds have already been disbursed or corresponding procurement contracts awarded.

Source: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence — 37th UDCG meeting outcomes

2. Legal Assessment: Five Issues for European Companies

2.1. Intergovernmental Arrangements Do Not Replace Commercial Contracts

Letters of intent and framework memoranda can establish political commitments and mechanisms for cooperation. Their binding effect depends on their actual wording, the parties' intentions and the applicable legal framework.

They do not automatically grant individual companies enforceable rights to funding, procurement contracts, production licences or intellectual property.

Those rights and obligations must be established through the relevant agreements, regulatory approvals and procurement arrangements.

Practical consequence: Before committing resources, companies should determine who will purchase the products, which entity will own or license the technology, what approvals are required and which party bears contractual and regulatory liability.

2.2. The AI Act: Military Exclusion Requires a Purpose-Specific Assessment

Article 2(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 excludes AI systems where and insofar as they are placed on the market, put into service or used exclusively for military, defence or national security purposes.

Recital 24 clarifies the consequences of using such systems for other purposes, including civilian applications.

The exclusion is therefore not a permanent exemption attaching to a technology merely because it was initially developed for defence.

Consider an AI model trained on battlefield imagery and subsequently adapted for civilian port logistics, infrastructure inspection or industrial perimeter monitoring.

The application of the AI Act would require an assessment of the system's intended purpose, actual deployment, the operator's role and the Regulation's territorial scope.

The company developing or adapting the system may qualify as a provider, depending on the circumstances and the definitions in Article 3. However, fine-tuning alone does not automatically establish provider status.

The timing of applicable obligations also matters.

Following Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, the principal high-risk AI requirements under Chapter III, Sections 1–3, are scheduled to apply:

  • From 2 December 2027 for high-risk systems under Article 6(2) and Annex III;

  • From 2 August 2028 for high-risk systems under Article 6(1) and Annex I.

Other AI Act obligations may already apply.

Practical consequence: Defence companies considering civilian or mixed-use applications should document the intended purpose, applicable exclusions, regulatory role and compliance timeline before commercial deployment.

2.3. Battlefield Data: Access Controls Do Not Resolve Data Rights

Avengers Labs provides a controlled environment in which participants can work with AI models without direct access to the underlying battlefield dataset.

This reduces certain risks associated with unrestricted data access. It does not resolve every question concerning personal data, confidentiality, intellectual property or the downstream use of trained models.

Battlefield recordings may contain identifiable individuals, including civilians or prisoners of war. Whether particular material constitutes personal data requires a factual assessment.

The application of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) must then be assessed by reference to the nature of the processing, the parties involved and the Regulation's material and territorial scope.

Article 2(2)(a) excludes activities outside the scope of EU law. That exclusion cannot be determined solely by whether an organisation is public or private.

Where GDPR applies, the relevant questions include identifying controllers and processors, establishing a lawful basis, determining the purpose of processing, implementing security safeguards and assessing any international transfers.

Separate contractual questions concern:

  • Rights to use and license trained models and model weights;

  • Ownership or contractual control of outputs and evaluation results;

  • Restrictions on commercial exploitation and onward transfers;

  • Audit rights, confidentiality and security obligations.

Practical consequence: Access to a secure AI training environment should be supported by a contractual framework addressing data governance, permitted use, intellectual property and downstream commercial rights.

2.4. Defence Production and Technology Transfer Remain Subject to Export Controls

Finland's commitment to facilitate industrial cooperation does not eliminate applicable authorisation requirements.

For defence products, the legal assessment should include Finland's Act on the Export of Defence Materiel (282/2012), the relevant national licensing framework and the criteria established by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.

Product classification should also take account of the EU Common Military List adopted on 23 February 2026.

For controlled dual-use items, including relevant software and technology, Regulation (EU) 2021/821 provides the applicable EU framework.

A further development is relevant to companies planning technology transfers: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/2288, updating the EU dual-use control list, was published in the Official Journal on 19 November 2026.

Companies should establish which version of the control list applies at the time of the proposed transaction.

Technology originating in Ukraine may also be subject to Ukrainian export-control requirements under Law No. 549-IV, including applicable authorisations for international transfers of military and dual-use goods and technologies.

Export-control analysis must not stop at the finished product. Controlled software, source code, technical documentation and technical assistance may require separate consideration.

The statement that most jointly produced equipment will be directed towards Ukraine does not establish unrestricted permission to sell the remainder to third countries.

Practical consequence: Before technology transfer or production begins, each participant should establish the classification, licensing authority, end-user restrictions and any re-export limitations applicable to the transaction.

2.5. Different Funding Channels Create Different Contractual Requirements

The financial announcements should not be treated as a single procurement programme.

The Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) is a NATO-coordinated mechanism through which Allies and partners fund the acquisition of critical US defence equipment for Ukraine.

Support for Ukrainian-manufactured drones may follow different national purchasing and financing arrangements.

The applicable contracting authority, procurement rules, eligibility criteria and supplier obligations must therefore be established for each mechanism.

Depending on the transaction, companies may need to demonstrate compliance with sanctions requirements, export controls, end-user restrictions, security conditions and contractual due diligence obligations.

Practical consequence: Suppliers should prepare a transaction-specific compliance file rather than assume that participation in one assistance mechanism establishes eligibility under another.

Source: NATO — Support for Ukraine

3. Limits of This Assessment

The complete texts of the Danish letter of intent, the separate Avengers Labs agreement and the Finnish memorandum have not been examined for this analysis.

The assessment relies on published statements from the relevant defence ministries and governments, together with the applicable legislation.

Subsequent intergovernmental arrangements or implementing contracts may establish rules on intellectual property, data processing, export restrictions and financial responsibility that are not disclosed in the public announcements.

The AI Act assessment also depends on the intended and actual use of each system. A system used exclusively for qualifying military or defence purposes may fall outside the Regulation, while a civilian application requires a separate analysis.

These distinctions should not be resolved by assumptions about a technology's origin or potential market.

4. Four Actions for Companies Considering Participation

1. Classify the technology. Document the intended military, civilian or mixed-use applications of each product. Assess the relevant AI Act provisions and the applicable military or dual-use export-control classifications.

2. Obtain the governing agreements. For any proposed Avengers Labs participation, request the relevant access and licensing terms. Establish data-governance responsibilities, rights to model weights and outputs, onward-transfer restrictions and available audit mechanisms.

3. Map the Finnish and Ukrainian authorisation requirements. Identify the approvals required for manufacturing, technology transfer, exports and re-exports. Include software, documentation and technical assistance where relevant.

4. Complete legal due diligence before contractual commitment. Prioritise projects involving civilian AI applications, cross-border technology transfers, third-country sales, potentially identifiable battlefield data or unclear intellectual property rights.

These steps should be completed before making binding commitments that depend on regulatory permissions or rights that have not yet been established.

Conclusion

The 37th Ramstein meeting confirmed substantial political and financial support for Ukraine and further opportunities for European defence industrial cooperation.

Denmark's defence AI initiative and Finland's joint-production framework may facilitate projects involving Ukrainian technology, European industrial capacity and cross-border investment.

For companies entering these arrangements, the immediate task is to establish a legally workable transaction structure.

That means identifying the contracting parties, securing technology rights, determining the applicable regulatory regimes and obtaining the necessary authorisations before production or commercial deployment.

Government cooperation can create an opportunity. Its commercial execution still depends on the applicable law and the agreements between the parties.

CORVUS AI advises European companies, investors and industrial consortia on Ukrainian and EU legal requirements relevant to defence technology, cross-border cooperation and market entry.

A product description and an outline of the proposed contractual structure provide the starting point for a project-specific legal and regulatory assessment.

Disclaimer

This article has been prepared by CORVUS AI for general informational and educational purposes only. It is intended to make complex legal and regulatory developments easier to understand.

It does not constitute legal advice and does not create a professional adviser–client relationship. The information should not be relied upon as a substitute for advice based on the specific facts, circumstances and applicable law relevant to your organisation or project.

The article reflects our understanding of the law and regulatory framework as of the date of publication. Legislation, case law, regulatory guidance and administrative practice may subsequently change. While reasonable care has been taken in preparing this article, CORVUS AI does not warrant that the information is complete or remains current after the date of publication. We do not undertake to update this content.

To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, CORVUS AI excludes liability for loss arising from reliance on this article. Nothing in this article constitutes an offer or solicitation to provide regulated legal services in any jurisdiction where doing so would be unlawful.

AI-assisted preparation: This article was prepared with the assistance of AI tools. Its legal analysis, conclusions and final text were subject to human review and editorial control and were reviewed and approved prior to publication by Oleksandr Sobovyi, Founder & CEO of CORVUS AI. CORVUS AI retains editorial responsibility for the published content.

For advice tailored to your organisation, project or specific circumstances, please contact CORVUS AI.

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