NATO Engine: A New Route for Scaling Defence Technologies and Manufacturing Cooperation

Complex law. Clear action.

NATO has launched NATO Engine, a new platform designed to connect defence-tech companies seeking to increase production with factories, research organisations and engineering centres that have available or adaptable manufacturing capacity.

The initiative was introduced as part of NATO’s broader effort to accelerate the adoption and industrial scaling of emerging defence technologies. Its central objective is to address one of the main obstacles faced by technology companies: the difficulty of moving quickly from product development and prototyping to serial production.

The pilot phase began in July 2026 and is managed by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency — NSPA.

From prototype to industrial scale

Many technology companies are capable of developing an advanced unmanned system, sensor, communications solution, autonomous platform or software-enabled defence product, but do not have their own manufacturing facilities.

Building a dedicated production site requires significant investment, specialised personnel, equipment, permits and time. For smaller companies and non-traditional defence suppliers, this production gap can become a greater barrier than the development of the technology itself.

NATO Engine is intended to provide an alternative model.

A technology company may gain access to the existing facilities of another manufacturer, factory or research organisation and arrange production through a manufacturing-as-a-service or contract manufacturing structure.

The platform is expected to provide information about manufacturing organisations and available capacity that may be offered to other companies. This should allow developers to identify suitable industrial partners without first building a complete production infrastructure of their own.

What the pilot phase covers

The initial pilot focuses on several areas:

• additive manufacturing, including specialised 3D printing;

• engineering services;

• manufacturing-as-a-service;

• the industrial scaling of new technological products.

The platform may involve not only traditional defence manufacturers but also civil industrial facilities, engineering organisations, research institutions and other entities capable of adapting their production capacity to defence and security requirements.

NATO Engine should therefore be understood as more than a supplier directory. It has the potential to develop into a cross-border industrial network connecting technological innovation with existing manufacturing capability.

Ukraine’s participation

One of the most significant elements of the initiative is that Ukraine has been invited to participate in the pilot phase.

This may create new opportunities for Ukrainian developers of unmanned systems, communications equipment, sensors, electronic warfare technologies, software-enabled products and other defence-tech solutions.

For Ukrainian companies, NATO Engine may support two principal routes of participation.

The first is access to manufacturing capacity in NATO countries for the localisation, contract production or scaling of Ukrainian technologies.

The second is the provision of Ukrainian engineering expertise, manufacturing capability, operational knowledge and technology to other companies participating in the network.

However, participation in NATO Engine does not automatically provide access to NATO procurement contracts, grant funding or guaranteed orders.

The platform primarily facilitates connections between companies. Any resulting commercial cooperation must still be negotiated and implemented directly by the participants.

Commercial agreements remain business-to-business

Commercial agreements resulting from contacts made through NATO Engine will be concluded directly between the companies concerned.

NATO and NSPA provide the platform and the infrastructure for identifying potential partners, but they do not become parties to the resulting manufacturing agreements.

This distinction is legally important.

NATO does not guarantee:

• the performance of a manufacturing contract;

• the quality or conformity of the final product;

• the protection of intellectual property;

• the issuance of export licences;

• the availability of regulatory approvals;

• compliance with national or European law.

Each company remains responsible for conducting due diligence, assessing the proposed production structure, negotiating contractual protections and complying with the applicable legal requirements.

Legal issues that should be addressed before production begins

A manufacturing arrangement in the defence sector requires significantly more than agreement on price, volume and delivery dates.

Before sharing technical information or beginning production, the parties should establish a clear legal and operational framework.

Export control

Responsibility for export licences, authorisations and regulatory compliance remains with the companies participating in each transaction.

Depending on the technology, countries involved and intended end use, the following regimes may apply:

• national military export control rules;

• Regulation (EU) 2021/821 governing dual-use items;

• sanctions and restrictive measures;

• controls on software and technology transfers;

• re-export restrictions;

• end-user and end-use requirements;

• restrictions on access to controlled technical information.

Moving production to another country does not remove export control obligations.

In many cases, it creates a more complex licensing chain involving the country of the technology owner, the country of manufacture, component suppliers and the destination of the finished product.

Companies should therefore establish the product’s export classification and licensing requirements before transferring designs, components or technical documentation.

Intellectual property

Manufacturing cooperation often requires the transfer of sensitive intellectual property, including:

• technical drawings;

• CAD files;

• source code;

• manufacturing instructions;

• software configurations;

• test data;

• prototypes;

• confidential know-how.

Before such information is transferred, the parties should determine:

• who owns the original technology;

• what rights are granted to the manufacturer;

• whether the manufacturer may modify the design;

• who owns improvements or derivative developments;

• whether subcontractors may access the technology;

• whether the manufacturing partner may use the knowledge for other customers;

• what happens to technical materials after the agreement ends.

The contract should also address reverse engineering, unauthorised production, residual knowledge and the use of manufacturing know-how developed during the cooperation.

Quality, testing and acceptance

The technology owner should define clear production, testing and acceptance criteria before serial manufacturing begins.

The agreement should cover:

• applicable technical specifications and standards;

• approved materials and components;

• testing procedures;

• quality-control documentation;

• product traceability;

• reporting of deviations;

• correction of defects;

• rejection and replacement procedures;

• rights to inspect or audit the production facility.

In unmanned, autonomous and defence systems, even a minor manufacturing deviation may affect the safety, reliability or operational performance of the entire system.

Quality control should therefore be treated as a contractual and governance issue, not merely as a technical process.

Cybersecurity and information protection

A manufacturing partner may receive access to sensitive technical documentation, software architecture, test results, production files and information about the product’s capabilities.

The parties should therefore define:

• which information may be accessed;

• who may access it;

• where it may be stored;

• how it may be transferred;

• whether cloud services may be used;

• how subcontractor access is controlled;

• how security incidents must be reported;

• how information must be returned or destroyed after the project ends.

Depending on the product and organisations involved, additional obligations may arise under the NIS2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act, national security rules or specific contractual security requirements.

Responsibility and liability

The parties should clearly allocate responsibility for:

• design defects;

• manufacturing defects;

• defective components;

• delays;

• regulatory non-compliance;

• infringement of third-party intellectual property;

• cybersecurity incidents;

• unauthorised technology transfers;

• product recalls;

• damage caused by the final product.

Without a clear allocation of responsibility, a technology company may remain exposed even where the relevant failure occurred at the external manufacturing facility.

Insurance requirements, limitations of liability, indemnities and procedures for handling claims should therefore be addressed before production begins.

What NATO Engine could change for the defence-tech market

NATO Engine reflects a broader shift from closed and vertically integrated defence production toward distributed industrial ecosystems.

A technology company may no longer need to own every part of the production process.

Instead, it may concentrate on product development, software, systems integration, testing and customer requirements while relying on external manufacturers for serial production.

At the same time, civilian factories and engineering organisations may gain a route into defence supply chains by offering equipment, personnel and manufacturing capability.

This model may accelerate innovation and improve access to production capacity.

However, distributed and cross-border manufacturing also increases the number of companies, suppliers, jurisdictions and technology transfers involved in a single product.

As a result, legal and governance readiness will become an important part of manufacturing readiness.

Successful participation will depend not only on the quality of the technology, but also on the company’s ability to demonstrate:

• clear ownership of intellectual property;

• export control classification;

• documented production requirements;

• supplier oversight;

• quality and acceptance procedures;

• cybersecurity protections;

• change-management controls;

• allocation of contractual responsibility;

• lifecycle management of the product.

What companies should prepare now

Defence-tech companies considering participation in NATO Engine should prepare a concise manufacturing readiness package.

It may include:

1. A description of the product and its current Technology Readiness Level.

2. The proposed production volume and scaling timeline.

3. Required equipment, materials and engineering capabilities.

4. Export control and dual-use classification of the product and its principal components.

5. A description of the intellectual property structure and the technical materials that would need to be transferred.

6. Quality, testing and product acceptance requirements.

7. Cybersecurity and information-protection requirements.

8. The proposed division of responsibility between the technology owner, manufacturer and component suppliers.

9. Any required certifications, licences or regulatory authorisations.

10. A process for managing product changes, incidents, defects and production termination.

Ukrainian companies should also determine which parts of the production process may remain in Ukraine, which activities may be transferred to a NATO country, and what licences will be required for the movement of technology, components and finished products between jurisdictions.

Conclusion

NATO Engine creates a practical mechanism for addressing the manufacturing gap between a promising defence technology and its production at scale.

The platform may be particularly valuable for smaller defence-tech companies, developers of unmanned and autonomous systems, and Ukrainian technology companies seeking access to European manufacturing capacity.

However, the platform does not remove the legal and commercial responsibilities associated with cross-border defence production.

Export control, intellectual property, licensing, cybersecurity, product quality and liability must still be addressed directly by the parties to each transaction.

The strongest position will belong to companies that can demonstrate not only an innovative product, but also the legal, technical and organisational readiness required to bring it safely and responsibly into industrial production.

What matters. What’s next.