EU IPI Review 2026: Procurement Barriers and Legal Risks

Complex law. Clear action.

Reviewed by Oleksandr Sobovyi, Founder & CEO of CORVUS AI — editorial responsibility statement below.

The European Commission is seeking stakeholder input on the first review of the International Procurement Instrument (IPI), Regulation (EU) 2022/1031. The consultation closes in late November 2026, although two official Commission publications specify different deadlines. The central issue goes beyond the effectiveness of trade restrictions: the Commission has identified substantial barriers to EU companies in foreign procurement markets, yet its formal complaint mechanism has attracted no substantiated complaints during the period covered by its first implementation report.

The scale of the problem is illustrated by the Commission's investigation into China's public procurement market for medical devices.

According to COM(2025) 430, the Commission identified evidence of discriminatory and exclusionary practices in 87% of the procurement contracts it was able to examine.

Despite those findings, the Commission reported that it had received no substantiated complaints through its dedicated IPI Online Complaint Tool. Its first investigation was launched on its own initiative.

This contrast raises a question for the forthcoming review: how can the IPI become a more effective mechanism for identifying and addressing procurement barriers when companies are reluctant to initiate formal proceedings?

The answer matters for European suppliers, international procurement consortia, contracting authorities and companies managing complex cross-border supply chains.

1. Legal framework and consultation deadlines

Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 entered into force on 29 August 2022. It establishes a mechanism through which the European Commission may investigate restrictions affecting EU economic operators, goods and services in third-country public procurement markets.

Where the legal conditions are satisfied, the Commission may adopt measures restricting access to certain EU procurement procedures.

Article 14 requires the Commission to review the Regulation's scope, functioning and efficiency no later than four years after the adoption of an implementing act or by 30 August 2027, whichever is earlier, and every five years thereafter.

The first implementing measure was adopted on 19 June 2025 through Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1197, concerning medical devices and economic operators originating in China.

Consequently, 30 August 2027 remains the relevant statutory deadline for the first review.

This review must be distinguished from the periodic implementation reports required under Article 13.

The Commission's first report, COM(2025) 430, was issued on 30 July 2025. It reports on the application of the Regulation and progress in international negotiations. Article 13 requires reporting at least every two years.

The Article 13 implementation report and the Article 14 review serve different legal purposes. Neither should be treated as an automatic legislative amendment procedure.

Consultation deadline: two official dates

The Commission's consultation page specifies:

• Opening date: 8 September 2026.

• Deadline: 1 December 2026, 00:00 CET.

• Submission channel: EUSurvey.

However, the Commission's announcement of 10 September 2026 describes a twelve-week consultation running from 4 September to 27 November.

Both dates appear in official Commission publications.

CORVUS recommends submitting contributions no later than 27 November 2026, subject to verification of the submission form's operational deadline.

The consultation addresses eight areas: the IPI's scope, determination of origin, the complaint tool, investigations and consultations, thresholds, the form and scope of measures, obligations on successful tenderers, and exceptions.

The Commission also intends to consider experience gained from the first investigation and the first IPI measure concerning medical devices.

2. Five legal issues that should shape the review

2.1. The Regulation itself limits the reach of IPI measures

Under Article 6(4) of Regulation 2022/1031, an IPI measure may apply only to procurement procedures with an estimated value meeting a threshold determined by the Commission.

The threshold must be at least:

• EUR 15 million, excluding VAT, for works and concessions.

• EUR 5 million, excluding VAT, for goods and services.

The Commission may set higher thresholds for a particular measure, but it cannot reduce them below these statutory minima through an implementing act.

Article 6(6) provides two forms of IPI measure:

Score adjustment. The contracting authority or entity applies an adjustment to tenders submitted by economic operators originating in the third country concerned.

Under Articles 6(7) and 6(8), the adjustment affects evaluation and ranking, not the actual contract price.

The adjustment may reach 50% of a tender's evaluation score. Where price or cost is the sole award criterion, the corresponding percentage is doubled, potentially reaching 100%, and is applied as an increase in the offered price solely for evaluation purposes.

Exclusion of tenders. The contracting authority or entity must exclude tenders falling within the defined scope of the IPI measure.

There is also a procedural constraint. Under Article 11(3), where the relevant committee delivers no opinion on a proposed exclusion measure, the Commission cannot adopt that draft implementing act.

These limitations have practical consequences.

In COM(2025) 430, the Commission acknowledged that the first IPI measure against China was narrower than the discriminatory practices identified during its investigation.

Chinese restrictions affected medical device procurement across a much wider range of contracts, whereas the EU response was limited by the minimum thresholds and conditions established in the IPI Regulation.

The distinction is fundamental.

The Commission can adjust an individual measure within the powers granted by the Regulation. It cannot remove the Regulation's statutory limits through secondary implementing measures.

Reducing minimum thresholds or introducing fundamentally different forms of IPI measures would require amendment of the legislative framework.

Article 14 itself requires a review and report, not a legislative proposal. Recital 32 nevertheless envisages that the review may be accompanied by legislative proposals where appropriate.

The consultation's questions on thresholds and the form of measures are therefore particularly important.

2.2. The complaint mechanism exists, but companies hesitate to use it

Article 5(1) provides for an online mechanism through which interested parties and Member States may submit substantiated complaints concerning alleged restrictions in third-country procurement markets.

The Commission established the IPI Online Complaint Tool.

Yet its first implementation report recorded no substantiated complaint received through that tool.

This does not mean that companies raised no concerns. The Commission expressly reported receiving informal complaints through other channels.

Nor does it establish that no formal complaints were submitted after July 2025. The report describes the position during its reporting period.

The Commission identified two principal explanations for the limited use of the formal mechanism.

First, suppliers depend heavily on public-sector customers in third countries. Even where confidentiality safeguards exist, businesses may fear targeted retaliation or adverse treatment if they submit a complaint.

Second, companies already active in those markets may have limited commercial interest in restricting access to the EU market as leverage in trade negotiations.

The Commission's report also refers to Chinese retaliatory measures adopted on 6 July 2025 following the EU's first IPI measure.

Those measures demonstrate that trade retaliation is a real consideration, although they do not, by themselves, establish that individual complainants would face targeted retaliation.

The resulting policy problem is more complex than insufficient awareness of the complaint tool.

The Commission already provides confidentiality and anonymity safeguards in the handling of complaints. The review should therefore examine why those safeguards have not been sufficient to encourage formal submissions and whether the existing complaint mechanism adequately reflects the commercial realities of international public procurement.

Three issues deserve particular attention.

First, the risks associated with individual complaints. Confidentiality does not necessarily eliminate the possibility that a foreign contracting authority could identify a complainant from the circumstances of a specific procurement procedure. Companies may therefore remain reluctant to provide detailed evidence, particularly where they depend on the same public customers for future contracts.

Second, the role of industry associations and collective evidence. Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 already allows interested parties to submit information and permits the Commission to initiate investigations on its own initiative. The review should consider whether industry associations and other representative bodies could play a more systematic role in collecting and presenting evidence of discriminatory procurement practices, reducing dependence on individual suppliers willing to submit formal complaints.

Third, the evidentiary burden. Procurement restrictions frequently arise not from legislation expressly excluding foreign bidders, but from administrative instructions, technical specifications, local-content preferences and procurement practices that are difficult to document. The Commission's investigation into China's medical devices market demonstrated the substantial resources required to obtain and assess such evidence.

The Commission's implementation report, COM(2025) 430, expressly recognises these difficulties and the importance of maintaining close cooperation with industry.

The practical question is therefore not simply how to encourage more complaints, but how to make credible evidence of third-country procurement barriers available to the Commission without requiring individual companies to assume disproportionate commercial risks.

A more structured approach to confidential evidence collection, cooperation with industry associations and proactive market monitoring could strengthen the IPI's investigative function without changing the Commission's existing powers under Article 5.

These are potential improvements for consideration in the review, not measures already announced or endorsed by the Commission.

For CORVUS, this is one of the most commercially and legally relevant questions in the consultation: whether the IPI can develop from a mechanism primarily activated through Commission-led investigations into a more accessible instrument supported by reliable, industry-generated evidence.

Disclaimer

This article has been prepared by CORVUS AI for general informational and educational purposes only. It is intended to make complex legal and regulatory developments easier to understand.

It does not constitute legal advice and does not create a professional adviser–client relationship. The information should not be relied upon as a substitute for advice based on the specific facts, circumstances and applicable law relevant to your organisation or project.

The article reflects our understanding of the law and regulatory framework as of the date of publication. Legislation, case law, regulatory guidance and administrative practice may subsequently change. While reasonable care has been taken in preparing this article, CORVUS AI does not warrant that the information is complete or remains current after the date of publication. We do not undertake to update this content.

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AI-assisted preparation: This article was prepared with the assistance of AI tools. Its legal analysis, conclusions and final text were subject to human review and editorial control and were reviewed and approved prior to publication by Oleksandr Sobovyi, Founder & CEO of CORVUS AI. CORVUS AI retains editorial responsibility for the published content.

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