EDIP’s First Five Defence Projects: What Suppliers Need to Map as Implementation Begins

Complex law. Clear action.

Reviewed by Oleksandr Sobovyi, Founder & CEO of CORVUS AI — editorial responsibility statement below.

The EU has formally identified its first five European Defence Projects of Common Interest. They are now eligible for EDIP funding. But identification is not a funding award — and it does not yet answer the question most relevant to industry: how companies will enter the delivery structure.

On 28 September 2026, the Council of the European Union identified the first five European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs) under the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP).

The decision moves five major capability areas further towards implementation:

• DECODER — DronE and Counter Drone European Resolve, covering drones and counter-drone capabilities;

• IMSD — Integrated Maritime and Seabed Defence, focused on integrated maritime and seabed protection;

• SPACE, covering capabilities including space-based early warning, satellite communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, positioning and timing, navigation warfare and responsive space systems;

• EU-FIAMD — EU Federated Integrated Air and Missile Defence including Early Warning;

• Eastern Flank Watch, covering a multi-domain approach to strengthening security along the Union’s eastern border.

The decision matters not only because of the technologies involved.

It establishes the formal EDPCI status under which major collaborative European defence initiatives can move towards funding and implementation.

For defence companies, however, the key question is no longer simply which projects Europe has selected.

It is:

Where, legally and commercially, is the route into those projects?

Identification is not the same as a funding award

The legal distinction is important.

European Defence Projects of Common Interest were established under Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP).

Under Article 35, EDPCIs are collaborative industrial projects intended to strengthen the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base while contributing to military capabilities critical for EU security and defence interests.

Article 35(3) empowers the Council, acting on a proposal from the European Commission, to adopt implementing acts identifying EDPCIs.

That process has now produced the first five identified projects.

The projects are therefore eligible to receive EU funding through EDIP.

But identification itself is not an award of Union funding to a particular company, consortium or supplier.

The Commission expressly stated during the identification process that the decision would be without prejudice to subsequent decisions awarding Union funding and that EDPCI financing would follow a dedicated procedure.

This distinction matters commercially.

Companies should not treat the Council decision as if five conventional procurement competitions had simply been launched.

The next stage concerns funding, governance, implementation and industrial architecture.

€325 million of EDIP support — against a much larger funding ambition

EDIP allocates €325 million to support the establishment and deployment of European Defence Projects of Common Interest.

That amount should not be confused with the overall financial ambition associated with the five projects.

When proposing the EDPCIs in July 2026, the Commission described them as having a combined funding ambition of around €190 billion by 2036.

That figure is not an EU budget commitment or guaranteed procurement volume.

The €325 million represents the EDIP contribution currently allocated to supporting the establishment and deployment of EDPCIs.

The much larger figure reflects the Commission’s stated long-term funding ambition for the capabilities concerned.

For industry, the implication is important: the potential industrial opportunity extends far beyond the immediate EDIP budget line, but access will depend on how each EDPCI is translated into actual development, procurement, production and supply-chain structures.

The industrial structure is where the real questions begin

The five projects already have participating countries, capability objectives and indicative financial scale.

What identification does not provide every prospective industrial participant with is a single, uniform supplier-entry route.

Depending on the project, implementation may involve:

• participating states;

• national contracting authorities;

• joint procurement arrangements;

• programme structures;

• Structures for European Armament Programme (SEAPs);

• industrial consortia;

• prime contractors and system integrators;

• cross-border development arrangements;

• manufacturers;

• specialised technology suppliers and sub-suppliers.

That makes early mapping critical.

A company looking at DECODER, for example, should not stop at asking whether its drone, counter-UAS sensor, electronic-warfare component or autonomous technology fits the capability domain.

It should determine where that technology could sit within the emerging implementation and contractual architecture.

The same applies to maritime and underwater technologies under IMSD, satellite capabilities under SPACE, air and missile defence technologies under EU-FIAMD, and systems relevant to the multi-domain Eastern Flank Watch.

Five legal questions suppliers should map now

Before a supplier approaches a potential prime contractor, consortium, programme structure or national authority, at least five legal workstreams should be understood.

1. Who will actually contract?

An EDPCI is a European collaborative project framework. It does not automatically constitute a single procurement contract.

Companies therefore need to identify the likely contracting route:

EDPCI framework → participating states or programme structure → procurement or industrial arrangement → prime or consortium → supplier or sub-supplier.

The commercial value and legal position of a company can change substantially depending on where it enters this chain.

For SMEs in particular, identifying the relevant contracting route may be more important than simply monitoring published EU funding opportunities.

2. How will industrial workshare be allocated?

Large multinational defence programmes raise questions around:

• allocation of development work;

• manufacturing location;

• production capacity;

• national industrial participation;

• integration responsibilities;

• supply-chain resilience;

• access to testing and qualification infrastructure.

A technically attractive partner may still be commercially difficult to integrate if workshare, manufacturing or industrial requirements are addressed too late.

3. Who owns the resulting IP?

Collaborative defence development can create several layers of intellectual property and contractual access rights:

background IP brought into the project;

foreground IP generated through development;

software, source code and technical documentation;

design rights and manufacturing know-how;

data and test results;

integration interfaces;

and improvements generated through collaborative work.

The relevant questions therefore go beyond formal ownership.

They include:

Who may use the technology?

Who may modify or integrate it?

Who may manufacture it?

What access rights are needed by governments, primes and other project participants?

What happens to those rights after the initial project ends?

For software-intensive and dual-use defence systems, access and licensing rights may be commercially as important as formal ownership.

The precise answers will depend on the applicable procurement, funding and contractual arrangements.

4. What security-of-supply requirements may affect the supply chain?

EDIP is designed not only to strengthen defence technology and industrial capacity but also to improve the availability and security of supply of defence products.

The Regulation establishes an EU security-of-supply framework involving supply-chain mapping, monitoring and mechanisms for responding to serious disruptions.

Depending on the implementation and procurement structure of an EDPCI, relevant security-of-supply requirements may therefore need to be reflected in prime contracts, supply agreements and subcontracting arrangements.

Commercial issues can include:

• production continuity;

• access to critical components;

• manufacturing capacity;

• supply-chain transparency;

• dependency on third-country inputs;

• resilience of critical suppliers;

• information and reporting requirements.

These issues should be identified before a supplier commits to delivery terms that it may later struggle to satisfy.

5. What restrictions apply to technology, entities and supply chains?

For companies seeking to supply or participate in the implementation of an EDPCI, incorporation alone may not determine whether a proposed industrial arrangement is acceptable.

Depending on the applicable funding, procurement and contractual rules, relevant considerations may include:

• ownership and control;

• location of infrastructure and production assets;

• third-country restrictions;

• origin of critical components;

• security requirements;

• export and re-export controls;

• handling of classified or sensitive information;

• technology-transfer rights;

• subcontracting structures.

The precise eligibility and participation rules need to be tested against the relevant implementation mechanism rather than assumed from the EDPCI designation alone.

Norway and Ukraine add another cross-border dimension

The first EDPCIs are not limited exclusively to EU Member States.

Norway is listed as a participating country in all five projects.

Ukraine participates in four: DECODER, IMSD, EU-FIAMD and Eastern Flank Watch.

Ukraine is not listed as a participant in SPACE.

The Commission also stated that, on average, 18 Member States participate in each project.

This creates significant opportunities for cross-border industrial cooperation — but also additional legal interfaces.

For European companies working with Ukrainian defence technology, participation may raise questions involving:

• technology transfer;

• export and re-export controls;

• security classification;

• intellectual property and licensing;

• manufacturing location;

• testing and operational data;

• procurement requirements;

• supply-chain governance.

The broader policy objective of integrating Ukraine more closely into Europe’s defence industrial ecosystem therefore needs to be translated into workable legal and contractual arrangements at project level.

Why waiting for a procurement notice may mean entering late

A recurring misconception in European defence programmes is that the commercial opportunity starts only when a call or procurement notice appears.

For programmes of this scale, important industrial positioning can occur earlier.

Capability architecture may already be developing.

Participating states and programme structures may be identifying implementation models.

Potential primes and industrial leaders may be mapping supply chains and technology partners.

Workshare assumptions and integration requirements may begin taking shape before an individual supplier encounters a public procurement opportunity.

This does not mean that applicable procurement procedures can be bypassed or that future contracts can be secured informally.

It means something different:

companies should understand the architecture before competing within it.

A supplier entering later may still win work.

But it may be negotiating after important assumptions concerning programme structure, workshare, IP, interfaces and industrial relationships have already been shaped.

What defence companies should do now

For companies whose products fall within one of the five EDPCI capability areas, the immediate task is therefore not simply to “find the call”.

It is to build an entry map.

That map should identify:

Capability fit
Which specific EDPCI objective does the technology support?

Participating countries
Which states are involved in the relevant project?

Implementation route
Which authorities, programme structures, primes or industrial arrangements are likely to shape delivery?

Industrial role
Is the company realistically positioned as a prime, consortium participant, technology partner, manufacturer, integrator or sub-supplier?

Legal eligibility
Which ownership, control, infrastructure, origin or supply-chain requirements may apply to the relevant route?

IP position
What technology can be contributed, and under what ownership, licensing and access-rights model?

Security and export control
What restrictions apply to sensitive information, technology transfer and cross-border supply?

Partner strategy
Which relationships should be established before industrial and procurement structures become fixed?

This is the difference between merely monitoring an EU defence initiative and preparing to enter its implementation architecture.

For suppliers, the next phase is increasingly contractual

The Council’s decision of 28 September is an important milestone in the implementation of European defence industrial policy.

DECODER, IMSD, SPACE, EU-FIAMD and Eastern Flank Watch now have formal EDPCI status and are eligible to receive support under EDIP.

For industry, however, the next questions increasingly concern contracts, procurement and industrial positioning:

Who procures?

Who coordinates?

Who develops?

Who integrates?

Who manufactures?

Who controls the resulting technology and access rights?

What supply obligations arise?

And where can additional industrial participants enter the structure?

For companies seeking to participate, those questions are worth mapping before — rather than after — the relevant procurement or supplier opportunity reaches the market.

Disclaimer

This article has been prepared by CORVUS AI for general informational and educational purposes only. It is intended to make complex legal and regulatory developments easier to understand.

It does not constitute legal advice and does not create a professional adviser–client relationship. The information should not be relied upon as a substitute for advice based on the specific facts, circumstances and applicable law relevant to your organisation or project.

The article reflects our understanding of the law and regulatory framework as of the date of publication. Legislation, case law, regulatory guidance and administrative practice may subsequently change. While reasonable care has been taken in preparing this article, CORVUS AI does not warrant that the information is complete or remains current after the date of publication. We do not undertake to update this content.

To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, CORVUS AI excludes liability for loss arising from reliance on this article. Nothing in this article constitutes an offer or solicitation to provide regulated legal services in any jurisdiction where doing so would be unlawful.

AI-assisted preparation: This article was prepared with the assistance of AI tools. Its legal analysis, conclusions and final text were subject to human review and editorial control and were reviewed and approved prior to publication by Oleksandr Sobovyi, Founder & CEO of CORVUS AI. CORVUS AI retains editorial responsibility for the published content.

For advice tailored to your organisation, project or specific circumstances, please contact CORVUS AI.

CORVUS AI advises companies operating across EU and Ukrainian defence and dual-use markets on regulatory strategy, procurement, consortium and programme structures, contracts, intellectual property, export controls, cybersecurity and EU programme participation.

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